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Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (edited by Sandy Levinson,
Mark Tushnet and me), which has just been published by Oxford
University Press, documents the right-wing populist surge taking
place across the globe. Right-wing populists now govern in
Turkey, Poland, Hungary, India, South Africa, Israel, and the
United States. They are gaining ground in almost every European
nation outside of Scandinavia, most notably in Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Austria. Right-
wing populists are weakening the European Union. Even Australia
has not been immune to the siren call of a more ethnic and
religious nationalism.  When empowered, right-wing populists take aim at the inclusive,
secular and cosmopolitan commitments of contemporary constitutionalism, and the
independent courts designed to foster those commitments.
Many of the thirty-eight essays in the volume by very distinguished contributors note that
economics is an obvious cause of the right-wing populist surge. “Populism,” Samuel
Issacharoff writes, “responds to the perceived failure of democratic regimes to protect the
laboring classes from economic distortion. The combination of the economic downturn after
2008 and the impact of globalized trade on wages in the advanced industrial countries
tarnished the legitimacy of democratic regimes as an insider’s game, a means of
institutionalizing elite prerogatives.” Numerous essays on particular regimes agree that
populist appeals gain currency during economic hard times and are particularly powerful in
the most economically depressed regions.  Jennifer Hochschild observes that Trump
supporters come from those parts of the United States experiencing high rates of addiction,
high mortality rates, and low prospects of economic improvement. These demographics of
the right-wing populist surge support David Law and Chien-Chih Lin’s suggestion that
constitutional democracy is an acquired taste of people whose bellies are full.
The question nevertheless remains why economics is privileging efforts to activate right-
wing populist identities. Mark Tushnet points out that populism comes in right-wing and left-
wing flavors. Left-wing populist movements fared well in the United States in the wake of
the Great Depression.  Their present failure cannot be explained by economics alone.
One possible answer is that cosmopolitan identities based on commitments to universal
human rights that underlie much contemporary constitutionalism are too thin for most
citizens. Sandy Levinson notes that Wilsonian self-determination, often seen as
foundational for constitutional democracy, implies a people united by racial, religious,
ethnic, or cultural norms. Most democratic citizens, Kim Lane Scheppele maintains, are
localists who “see their neighbors and their nation as the horizon of politics.” Ethnic
divisions explain much electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa and the problems launching
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democratic constitutionalism in that region. Right-wing political entrepreneurs in the United
States have historically used racial and ethnic fears to mobilize populists for some very
anti-populist causes.
The relationships between globalization and contemporary constitutional projects may
underlie right-wing populist surges. Globalization, what Lorraine Weinrib describes as the
postwar constitutional paradigm, and what others refer to as transformative
constitutionalism share commitments to cosmopolitan identities. The same global elites
who sponsor neoliberal economic policies champion independent courts, often champion
secularization, and favor formally inclusive policies, particularly when doing so rejects
traditional gender and sexuality norms. Globalism in practice, however, has more often
undermined than buttressed constitutional commitments to robust political freedoms and
broadly shared commercial prosperity. These failures empower right-wing political
entrepreneurs who by highlighting the political and normative affinities among globalization,
the postwar constitutional paradigm, and transformative constitutionalism successfully
channel opposition to the first into movements against the second and third.
The relationship between globalization and contemporary constitutional developments has
a dark side. Many cosmopolitans are far more committed to globalization, independent
courts, and secularism than robust political freedoms, broadly shared commercial
prosperity, and more robust conceptions of inclusivity. In his acclaimed Towards
Juristocracy, Ran Hirschl asserts that a neoliberal commitment to transnational open
markets was the central concern of those who inaugurated what was mistakenly labelled
transformative constitutionalism. Michaela Alterio and Roberto Niembro provide a variation
on this theme when discussing how the Mexican elites who championed transformative
constitutionalism in practice proved far more interested in preserving a favorable climate for
foreign investment than promoting broadly shared commercial prosperity. David
Schneiderman details how such regimes as Ecuador, Columbia, and South Africa
simultaneously adopted a transformative constitution and signed neoliberal trade
agreements, either because political leaders thought the two consistent or simply because
they needed the foreign investment. Over time, the neoliberal trade agreements proved
stronger, directly limiting national power to achieve transformative ends when those ends
conflicted with foreign investors and indirectly limiting national power through debt practices
that severely constrained domestic spending.
The resulting ambivalent and ambiguous relationship between the cosmopolitan
commitments inherent in the postwar constitutional paradigm and transformative
constitutionalism and the cosmopolitan commitments inherent in globalization facilitate
right-wing ethnonational appeals while complicating the task of left-wing political
entrepreneurs. All right-wing populist leaders must do is mobilize citizens against
cosmopolitans and cosmopolitanism. Political entrepreneurs on the left must mobilize
citizens against some cosmopolitans but not others, and some versions of cosmopolitanism
but not others. Conservative elites enjoy the relatively simple task of persuading less
fortunate citizens that the same persons and principles responsible for the company leaving
town are responsible for immigrants taking what few jobs remain and uprooting long-
established cultural norms. If the problem is foreign influence, then foreigners should be
prohibited from entering the country and long-standing national practices, including
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traditional religious practices, should be restored. If the problem is cosmopolitan elites, then
given the strong practical and theoretical connections between elite commitments to
globalization, secularism, and inclusiveness, ordinary people when rejecting globalization
should reject related commitments to secularism and inclusiveness. Or so the argument
easily goes. More progressive political entrepreneurs have a more daunting task. They
must first distinguish conservative and progressive versions of globalization that may not be
obviously distinguishable for many persons. They must then distinguish the not-to-be-
trusted cosmopolitan proponents of neoliberalism from the trusted cosmopolitan proponents
of broadly shared commercial prosperity, secularism, and inclusively, even though those
two camps are hardly mutually exclusive. Given the importance of quick soundbites in
contemporary democratic politics, persons mobilizing ethnocentric political identities clearly
have an easier task at present than those mobilizing cosmopolitan identities.
Constitutional design is unlikely to prove much of a bulwark against right-wing populism. 
Political entrepreneurs promising a more sectarian regime that will privilege persons on the
basis of their ancestry, race, and religion, and will enforce more traditional gender and
sexuality norms, are gaining an increased share of the vote across the globe. Right-wing
populists in office who curtail democratic liberties and undermine independent courts
remain electorally popular, in part because these measures are often directed at minorities
and in part because right-wing populists reshape the electoral universe to privilege their re-
election. Still, even without electoral manipulation, the number of voters supporting the
Trumps, Orbáns, and Netanyahus of the world will exercise substantial influence on
governmental practices in a constitutional democracy, no matter what the particular
constitutional rules. The real challenge for the persons committed to robust political
freedoms, broadly shared commercial prosperity, secularism, inclusiveness, and
independent courts is finding political ways to reduce the number of right-wing populists,
not finding legal ways to reduce their present influence.
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